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Abstract. Since 2005 the EU food industry has primary legal responsibility for food safety control. This requires new 
responsibilities and relationships between government and industry, and between companies. This research presents 
a framework for incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains. It emphasizes key elements of food safety 
control from multiple perspectives and provides insights for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food 
safety control. An incentive system combines inter-company incentive mechanisms with intra-company decision 
making processes to control a hazard within the legal environment. Incentive mechanisms, which consist of a 
performance measure and a performance reward, induce companies to use control measures. The framework can be 
used to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative incentive systems in which companies have to cooperate 
with partners from other stages of the supply chain. 
Keywords: Incentive mechanism, food safety, supply chain control. 
1. Introduction 
Food safety is an important food attribute for consumers, governments and companies. Food safety is the 
“assurance that food will not cause harm to the consumer when it is prepared and/or eaten according to its 
intended use”[12]. A food product is safe for human consumption if it has been produced by applying all 
food safety requirements appropriate to its intended use, meets risk-based performance and process 
criteria for specified hazards, and does not contain hazards at levels that are harmful to human health[13]. 
In 2006 the EU reported 353,000 cases of human zoonoses, of which 53,568 were caused by 5,710 food 
borne outbreaks resulting in 5,525 hospitalizations and 50 deaths[15]. Reported cases are only a fraction of 
all food borne illnesses. Societal costs of food borne illness are expected to be high, although accurate 
reports are lacking. The EU estimated the costs of food-borne Salmonella in 2003 at €2.8 billion 
(European Commission Press Release IP/03/1306, 29-09-2003). Mangen et el.[41] estimated the costs of 
campylobacteriosis in the Netherlands in 2000 at €21 million. 
Demographic and public health developments in the EU will likely increase the susceptibility of the 
population for food borne hazards and the associated societal costs. In the EU-27 the number of people of 
65 years or older with a higher than average susceptibility for food borne illnesses, is expected to grow 
from 16% of the population in 2004 to 30% in 2050. More people will be cured from diseases as cancer 
with chemotherapy and radiation treatment resulting in an affected immune system. And more people will 
longer survive chronic viral diseases as HIV, that affect the immune system. These developments show 
the need for increased demands to future food safety control. 
EU food safety legislation at the end of the 20th century was insufficiently equipped to deal with the 
demands to future food safety control. It was fragmented, based on prescriptive laws, and used 
governmental inspection and testing for compliance[16]. With the General Food Law the EU adopted a 
new legislation to control food safety. Being based on integrated risk analysis throughout the food chain 
and primary legal responsibility for the food industry, it requires new responsibilities and relationships 
between the government and industry and between companies. Within this new institutional framework, 
EU food companies can design and implement effective and efficient solutions that deal with the demands 
to future food safety control. 
As food safety, food quality is an important food attribute. In contrast to food safety, it has been important 
for decades. Food quality control can therefore be a good example for future food safety control. Food 
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quality control combines managerial problem solving and technological solutions[40]. To control food 
quality companies have implemented control systems. A control system for food quality is the set of 
interdependent processes that function harmoniously, using various resources, to achieve the objectives 
related to food quality[33]. With a control system companies manage internal production processes. 
However, the quality of end products also depends on the quality of raw materials, as determined by 
suppliers. To improve raw material quality the food industry has implemented incentive mechanisms that 
induce quality control at suppliers[10,25]. Based on the example of quality control, we define an incentive 
system for food safety control as the combination of control systems for food safety within companies 
and incentive mechanisms for food safety control between companies in the supply chain. An incentive 
mechanism for food safety control is the set of performance measures and performance rewards between 
buyer and supplier, which induce the supplier to improve food safety. 
Incentive systems specifically designed for food safety control are only just arising. The first incentive 
system for food safety control was introduced in Denmark in 1995 and aimed to reduce Salmonella 
prevalence in primary pig production[3]. Further reductions of Salmonella prevalence in pork products can 
only be realized by allocating combined control effort among producers and slaughter plants[2,5]. How to 
design an incentive system that optimally allocates control effort among all companies in the food supply 
chain is unknown. 
This paper presents a framework for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control 
in multi actor supply chains. The framework identifies key elements of incentive systems for food safety 
control in a supply chain and considers food safety performance measures and performance rewards. 
These elements are critical for designing cost-effective incentive systems that meet future EU-level 
targets for food safety. 
2. Key elements of incentive systems for food safety control 
Food companies have adopted food safety control to comply with government regulation, to prevent 
market based threats, and to prevent liability[29,47]. An incentive system for food safety control induces 
companies in the various stages of the supply chain to implement control systems that ensure that food 
products meet specific food safety objectives. In designing such a system, we need to consider the supply 
chain organization. Critical dimensions of a supply chain are process activities, product flow, financial 
aspects, information, incentives, and governance[7]. Four institutional levels explain how companies 
function: social embeddedness, institutional environment, governance of relations, and incentive 
structures[63]. Based on the critical dimensions of supply chains and the institutional levels, we distinguish 
six key elements of an incentive system for food safety control (Figure 1): 
1) Food safety hazards: The characteristics of the hazards determine how it can be controlled. 
2) Legal environment: This provides the minimum requirements for the objectives of the incentive 
system and the companies involved in the system. 
 
 
Figure 1. Key elements of incentive systems for food safety control 
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3) Objectives of the incentive system: This provides the performance objectives concerning the hazards 
that are to be managed by the incentive system. 
4) Food supply chain: This concerns the stages and companies in the chain involved in controlling the 
hazards, product and process characteristics, and ownership patterns. 
5) Interaction between companies through incentive mechanisms: This concerns the arrangements and 
mechanisms that induce a company to control food safety, and their institutional environment such as 
contracts and information sharing. 
6) Intra-company decisions and actions: This concerns all drivers for and aspects of a company’s 
decision to control the hazards such as the available control measures, their effectiveness and impact 
on process activities, product flow, and financial features. 
In the next sections we discuss the key elements of incentive systems for food safety control. 
2.1. Food safety hazards 
The Codex Alimentarius[12] distinguishes microbiological, chemical and physical hazards. 
Microbiological hazards include bacteria, viruses, parasites, protozoa and fungi. Chemical hazards are 
caused by chemical substances and include residues of pesticides and medicines, and heavy metals and 
dioxins. Physical hazards include foreign bodies as glass, metal, wood and stone, and radiation. Food 
safety hazards can be characterized in how they enter and evolve in a product. A contaminant is “any 
biological or chemical agent, foreign matter, or other substance not intentionally added to food which 
may compromise food safety or suitability”[12]. Examples are microbiological hazards. In contrast, 
hazards exist that can only enter a product if specific operating procedures are used, as residues and 
needles. For microbiological hazards that can multiply as Salmonella and Listeria Monocytogenes, food 
safety risks can increase after entering the product. Conversely, some hazards, as chemical and physical 
hazards, do not multiply if present in a product. An incentive system for food safety control must consider 
the hazard’s characteristics, because these provide restrictions on how to control it. 
2.2. Legal environment 
In 2000 in the White Paper on Food Safety the EU set out over 80 legal actions to improve food safety, 
that were adopted the following years with as basis Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (General Food Law). 
Food safety control must be based on an integrated approach throughout the supply chain and on risk 
analysis of consumer health effects. The precautionary principle must be used in risk management 
decisions. Industry has the primary legal responsibility for producing safe food. Governments keep the 
final responsibility that marketed products are safe. EU food producing and processing companies have to 
work according to the principles of hazard analysis of critical control points (HACCP) (Regulation (EC) 
No 852/2004). Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 prescribes the EU member states how to perform official 
food safety controls. Governments can use tests, audits and inspections to verify if marketed products are 
safe. But, governments can also verify if a company’s system to control food safety ensures this without 
using tests, audits and inspections. With this so called supervision of control principle, private control 
systems for food safety can be used in public food safety control. For exporting supply chains it is 
essential that companies and governments of the importing countries accept this principle. 
Product liability laws can be a powerful inducement to improve food safety, if contaminations can be 
traced to the source and the responsible party faces significant liability costs[9]. The difficulty in 
identifying the source of contamination and limits on punitive penalties in the EU restrict the potential of 
product liability laws to improve food safety on farms and processing plants. However, product liability 
laws can provide strong incentives to improve food safety control in consumer outlets[34]. 
In Regulations (EC) No 2073/2005, 2160/2003, 396/2005, 2377/90 and 1881/2006 the EU establishes 
process and product norms, which depend on the hazard. Process norms ensure that the hygiene of a 
process complies with food law. Product norms provide a maximum concentration or prevalence of 
hazards in an epidemiological unit. For microbiological hazards, the European Food Safety Authority 
defines Appropriate Level of Protection (ALOP), Food Safety Objective (FSO), Performance Objectives 
(PO), and Performance Criterion (PC) [16]. The legal environment must be considered in the design of an 
incentive system for food safety control, because it sets minimum requirements to the system. 
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2.3. Objectives 
The objectives of an incentive system relate to the hazards and are set by its owner. The likely increase of 
susceptibility for food borne illnesses and deaths may influence future food safety objectives. A 
government system aims at compliance with the food safety legislation, for example in using FSO and PO 
as objectives. A private system aims at compliance with private norms. Private norms should include 
legal norms and can include additional norms of trading partners. Private systems can be used as 
marketing device and to exclude competitors. The objectives of an incentive system can focus on 
effectiveness, the extent to which an incentive system improves food safety. The objectives, especially of 
a private system, can also focus on efficiency, which relates the costs and benefits of food safety control 
to the effectiveness: Companies aim to control food safety with minimal costs. The effectiveness is often 
defined as the average performance change from the steady state before implementation of an incentive 
system related to the steady state after implementation. For example, the incentive system for Salmonella 
control in Danish pig production decreased the number of salmonellosis cases caused by pork from 1,100 
in 1993 to 166 in 2000[3]. Practical objectives should be realistic, because zero-tolerance and 100% 
compliance do not exist in real life. The objectives of the system as determined by the owner must be 
considered in the design of an incentive system for food safety control. 
2.4. Food supply chain 
A supply chain is a network of physical and decision-making activities connected by material and 
informational flows that cross organizational boundaries[60]. A food supply chain produces and distributes 
agricultural and horticultural products. Food supply chains have a large number of spatially dispersed 
primary producers that deliver products to few wholesalers or processing companies. Most primary 
producers are small compared to the wholesalers and processing companies. The distribution of returns 
between companies depends on the ownership structure in the supply chain, such as a cooperative or an 
investor owned firm[34]. Products and production processes in food supply chains have specific 
characteristics[4,61]. Biological mechanisms and weather, pests and other biological hazards result in large 
variation in quantity and quality. Seasonality in production necessitates global sourcing to provide a year 
round supply. Quality decay, while products pass through the supply chain, limits the shelf life of 
products. To restrict decay conditioned processing, transportation and storage is essential. However, even 
provides this, turnaround time from harvest to consumption has to be short for certain products to prevent 
spoilage. In the design of an incentive system for food safety control, number and size of companies, 
ownership structure, and product and process characteristics in the food supply chain must be considered, 
because these influence the choice of incentive system parameters. 
2.5. Inter-company interaction through incentive mechanisms 
Interactions between firms can be characterized by frequency, uncertainty and asset specificity. The 
agreements, or contracts, companies use in interactions are analyzed in Contract Theory[8]. If a contract is 
court enforceable, a formal contract, the risk of reneging is lower than if it is not court enforceable, an 
informal contract, which is often based on trust. The transaction costs of contracting, monitoring, and 
enforcing formal contracts exceed those of informal contracts. Transaction costs increase with the 
completeness of a contract, the extent to which it provides security on all possible outcomes. Limitations 
to the cognitive abilities of people and high transaction costs make all real contracts incomplete[62]. This 
creates room for opportunistic behaviour. Inter-company incentive mechanisms can minimize 
opportunistic behaviour. 
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Table 1. Elements of incentive mechanisms for food quality control 
Report Characteristics of incentive mechanism Main findings 
Objective Performance measurement Perfor-
mance 
reward 
Performance 
indicator 
I/O/Pa Absolute 
/ relative 
Who 
measures  
Accuracy 
Chalfant et 
al.[10] 
Quality Prune quantity, size O Absolute Dried Fruit 
Association 
Sample; 
testing 
error 
Variable 
piece rate 
To maximize profit processors use errors 
in grading process that reduce farmer 
incentives to produce high quality 
products. 
Curtis and 
McClusky[14] 
Quality Potato quantity, 
tuber weight, tare, 
various damages 
O,P Absolute Washington 
State 
Department of 
Agriculture 
Sample Variable 
piece rate 
Incentive contracts are effective at 
increasing potato load quality over a spot 
market. 
Hueth, Ligon, 
Wolf and 
Wu[26] 
Quality, 
efficient 
use inputs 
Fruit and vegetable 
quality, not further 
specified 
I,O,P  - - -  Variable 
piece rate 
Input control, field visits, quality 
measurement and residual price risk are 
instruments to reduce information 
asymmetry and align incentives between 
growers and first handlers. 
Hueth et al.[25] Quality Tomato quantity, 
colour, ‘limited 
use’, soluble solids, 
various damages 
O  Absolute Processing 
Tomato 
Advisory 
Board 
Sample Variable 
piece rate 
Growers facing high-powered incentives 
produce higher quality at higher cost. 
Quality measurement improves 
efficiency. Information constraints 
decrease efficiency. 
Hueth and 
Melkonyan[28] 
Quality Sugar beet 
quantity, purity 
O Absolute, 
relative 
-  - Variable 
piece rate 
Regional variation in growers’ ability to 
control measures of sugar beet quality 
causes variations in the set of 
performance indicators. 
Knoeber and 
Thurman[35] 
Quality, 
efficient 
use inputs 
Broiler meat 
quantity, feed 
conversion 
I,O Relative -  - Fixed, 
variable 
piece rate 
In mixed tournaments: price changes that 
do not change price differences, do not 
affect performance; more able players 
will choose less risky strategies; handicap 
players of unequal ability and reduce 
mixing can prevent disincentive effects. 
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Levy and 
Vukina[39] 
Quality, 
efficient 
use inputs 
Broiler meat 
quantity, settlement 
costs 
I,O Relative -  - Fixed, 
variable 
piece rate 
Tournaments mixing players of unequal 
abilities create a group composition 
effect. With fixed groups and a 
sufficiently long time horizon, piece rates 
improve welfare over tournaments. 
Martin[42] Quality, 
efficient 
use inputs 
Pig meat quantity, 
weight gain 
I,O Absolute, 
relative 
-  - Fixed, 
variable 
piece rate 
Contracts with absolute performance 
measures reduce risks of income 
variability compared to a spot market. 
Relative performance measures can 
further reduce income variability. 
Martinez and 
Zering[43] 
Quality, 
efficient 
use inputs 
Pig meat quantity, 
leanness, PSE, 
safety  
I,O,P Absolute  -  - Fixed, 
variable 
piece rate 
 ‘Smart’ contracts induce industry efforts 
to improve quality, reduce measuring 
costs, control quality attributes that are 
difficult to measure, facilitate adaptations 
to changing quality standards, and reduce 
transaction costs of relationship-specific 
investments. 
McDonald and 
Schroeder[44] 
Quality Beef quantity, yield 
grade, quality 
grade 
O Absolute - All items 
tested 
Fixed, 
variable 
piece rate 
Grid base price, feeder price, and 
cumulative quality in a pen are main 
determinants of profit for cattle farmers. 
a
 I/O/P = Performance indicator based on Input product / Output product / Process 
Table 2. Elements of incentive mechanisms for food safety control 
Report Characteristics of incentive mechanism Main findings 
Objective Performance measurementa Performance 
reward Performance 
indicator 
Who 
measures 
Accuracy Number of 
deliveries 
Alban et al.[3] Minimize 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
in pork 
Serological 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
Principal Sample 
size, test 
accuracy, 
cut-off 
value 
Current and 
past 
deliveries 
Penalty, 
mandated 
actions 
Danish program for Salmonella control in pigs was 
revised on: sampling procedure; exclusion of small 
herds; cut-off value of the test; use of results of 
previous months in performance; and monthly 
assignment of a herd to one of three levels. 
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Backus et al.[5] Minimize 
costs  and 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
in supply 
chain 
Serological 
and 
bacteriological 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
Principal Sample, 
testing 
probability 
Current and 
past 
deliveries 
Participation 
premium, 
penalty 
Dynamic principal-agent model of controlling 
Salmonella in the pork supply chain combines 
dynamic producer incentive systems on farm level 
with slaughter plant investments in control 
measures. Allocation of control effort among both 
farmers and slaughter plant results in lowest costs. 
Hirschauer et 
al.[23] 
Minimize 
fungicide 
levels 
Fungicide 
residue level, 
type-II-error 
Principal Random 
control 
intensity 
Current 
delivery 
Bonus, 
penalty 
Moral hazard model accounting for incomplete 
inspection and tracing, and for costs of monitoring, 
tracing and sanctioning analyzes behavioural food 
risks. High penalties can be necessary to provide 
sufficient incentives to farmers to keep the 
minimum waiting period after fungicide use. 
King et al. [34] Minimize 
costs and 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
Serological 
Salmonella 
prevalence 
Principal Sample, 
testing 
probability 
Current and 
past 
deliveries 
Participation 
premium, 
penalty 
Dynamic principal-agent model analyzes two 
incentive systems for Salmonella control that use 
producer performance history, testing frequencies, 
and charge testing costs and penalties to the 
producer. Relating the testing probability to a 
favorable production history reduces testing costs. 
Pouliot and 
Sumner[49] 
Minimize 
food safety 
failures  
Safe product 
not specified, 
type-II-error 
Third-party, 
government 
 - Current 
delivery 
Piece rate, 
liability costs 
In a farm-marketer-consumer-chain, traceability 
creates incentives for farms and marketers to 
supply safer food through liability. Imperfect 
consumer-marketer traceability dampens liability 
and farm incentives. Food safety declines with the 
number of farms and marketers. 
Starbird[53] Minimize 
unsafe lots 
Safe batch not 
specified 
Principal Sample 
size, 
acceptance 
number 
Current 
delivery 
Piece rate, 
penalty, 
internal failure 
costs 
A principal-agent model shows that regulation of 
sampling inspection procedures is an effective tool 
for policy makers to improve food safety. 
Starbird[54] Select safe 
suppliers 
Contaminated 
lot not 
specified 
Third-party, 
government 
Sample 
size, testing 
accuracy 
Current 
delivery 
Revenue loss, 
destruction 
Test accuracy and sampling error can be used to 
segregate safe and unsafe suppliers. 
a
 All use absolute product related performance indicators based on output. 
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2.5.1. Information asymmetry 
Information asymmetry about food safety exists between companies in a supply chain and the other 
stakeholders, because 1) real contracts are incomplete[62], so not all food safety related aspects are 
formalized in contracts; 2) it is often difficult or impossible to observe for other stakeholders as 
consumers, other companies or governments if a company uses control measures[23]; and 3) conflicting 
interests obstruct companies to share information about food safety control[11]. 
Transactions in the presence of information asymmetry are addressed in Agency Theory or the Theory of 
Incentives[38]. A principal delegates a service to an agent. This shifts part of the risk of reaching the 
desired outcome to the agent. The principal compensates the agent for the risk based on the performance 
of the service. Two agency problems can arise. The first is the adverse selection or hidden information 
problem. Prior to contracting the principal does not have full information about which agents use control 
measures. The principal only offers low compensation to avoid paying a high compensation to agents that 
do not use control measures. The low compensation is sufficient for agents that do not use control 
measures, but not for agents that do, because they have higher costs. So, agents that use control measures 
will not be contracted and the safer food is driven out of the market. The second is the moral hazard or 
hidden action problem. After delegation of the service, a principal can not observe the effort of agents to 
fulfill the service. This might tempt the agents to perform less effort, resulting in a lower performance 
than the principal desires. In food safety control agency problems can arise on three levels. First, the 
consumer is the principal and food companies are agents who have to use control measures to control 
food safety. Second, the government is the principal and companies are agents. Third, a buying company 
is the principal and its suppliers are agents. 
By sharing information companies can create value in a supply chain[17]. Companies refrain from sharing 
information out of fear for trading partners misusing it[46]. They fear that information sharing will 
diminish their bargaining power and precluding their sharing in the economic benefits[11]. Bigger 
companies are more willing to share information, because they receive a larger share of the total gains[45]. 
The presence of information asymmetry between organizations in and around the food supply chain must 
be considered in designing an incentive system for food safety control, to prevent adverse selection and 
moral hazard problems. 
2.5.2. Incentive mechanisms 
We defined incentive mechanisms as the set of performance measures and performance rewards between 
a buyer and supplier, which induce the supplier to improve food safety. The reward induces the supplier 
to control food safety and is based on the supplier’s performance. To determine the key elements of 
incentive mechanisms for food safety control we first analyze incentive mechanisms for food quality 
control. A non-exhaustive literature review revealed a number of incentive mechanisms for food quality 
control in animal and plant production (Table 1). The objectives of the incentive mechanisms are high 
product quality and efficient use of inputs. The performance indicators are product related, based on input 
or output, and process related. Process related indicators focus on a holistic view of agent effort, which 
prevents the sole allocation towards tasks that are rewarded, the dysfunctional behavioural response[6]. 
Audits and inspections are used to assess process related performance. These rely on personal judgment 
of the auditor or inspector unaided by information feed back, which can result in a possible inaccurate 
measurement of performance. Indeed, Hueth et al.[27] show evidence of grader bias in Iowa cattle markets. 
Harmonization and information feed back can be used to minimize the probability of an inaccurate 
measurement. 
Incentive mechanisms may use absolute and relative performance indicators. Absolute performance 
indicators assess an agent’s performance independent of the performance of other agents. Relative 
performance indicators or tournaments assess an agent’s performance relative to the performance of other 
agents in a reference group. Relative performance indicators filter out common risks on performance and 
structural errors in the performance indicator, and reduce income variability of the agent[42,50]. The 
organization that measures performance can be the principal or a third party. The assessment can be 
biased in favor of the assessor. Several reports consider samples and errors in performance measurement. 
Samples are used to measure performance, because testing all food products and auditing and inspection 
of all processes every day can be costly and time consuming. The characteristics of a sample can differ 
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from those of the batch, the sampling error. The sampling error can be partially controlled by random 
sampling. The characteristics of the processes during an audit or inspection can differ from the processes 
on other days, for example due to prior announcement of the visit. Random audits and inspections without 
prior announcement can partly overcome this problem. The quality performance is rewarded financially 
with a fixed or variable piece rate. Each quality attribute has its own performance measure and 
performance reward. 
The literature review revealed that actual incentive mechanisms in food safety control are scarce (Table 
2). Only Alban et al.[3] describe an actual incentive mechanism, the others theoretical mechanisms. 
Despite this, we can use these reports to derive specific characteristics of incentive mechanisms for food 
safety control not found in food quality control. The performance indicators include the prevalence of 
certain hazards, the level of residues, and the probability that unsafe products remain undetected within an 
epidemiological unit, the type-II-error. The type-II-error can only be measured if traceability exists. 
Alban et al.[3], Backus et al.[5] and King et al.[34] include performance of multiple deliveries in a 
mechanism to average out the variance in performance over deliveries. Backus et al.[5] show the value of 
including multiple stages of a supply chain to control Salmonella. Most reports consider the accuracy of 
the test through the rate of false positives and false negatives. The long time required before the test 
results are available[58], can collide with the turnaround time from harvest to consumption for certain 
products. The performance rewards include penalties for high risk products, additional internal costs, 
liability costs and scrapping costs. 
To our knowledge no empirical literature about the effectiveness of non-financial rewards in food 
production is available and literature about non-financial preferences is scarce. For dairy farmers non-
financial rewards as internal esteem and having healthy animals were equally motivating as monetary 
rewards[59]. Information sharing in relationships leads to favorable behavioural intentions and delivers 
value to the chain[17]. Publicizing information about an agent’s performance to a peer group results in peer 
pressure effects and improved performance[18]. Displaying hygiene grade cards in restaurant windows 
caused inspection scores of the restaurants to increase, consumers to be sensitive to a restaurant’s hygiene 
quality, and the number of food borne hospitalizations to drop[31]. Non-material extrinsic awards as 
orders, medals, decorations and prizes are widely used in monarchies, republics, non-profit organizations 
and companies[21]. Awards in Dutch agriculture include the “Hillenraad 100” for companies in 
horticulture and the “Dutch Flower Awards” for suppliers in the flower sector. So, non-financial rewards 
as information provision, peer pressure, and non-financial awards used in incentive mechanisms might 
induce company effort. 
From Table 1 and Table 2 we derive the key elements of performance measurement and performance 
reward in incentive mechanisms for food safety control (Figure 2). Performance measurement includes 
the performance indicator used to assess food safety performance, measurement accuracy, who measures 
performance, costs and time. Performance reward, which induce companies to use control measures, can 
be financial and non-financial. 
2.6. Intra-company decision making and actions 
The decision of an agent to use actions to control food safety is a key factor for his food safety 
performance. In food supply chains agents are companies. A company’s strategy is an important driver 
for its decisions. Main drivers for a company to adopt food safety control are expected sales and 
reputation [30]. Attuning an incentive mechanism to a company’s strategy helps it to optimally induce 
food safety control. 
Decisions in companies are made by people, implying that the drivers of their decisions also drive 
company decisions. Rational individuals maximize expected utility knowing all options, probabilities and 
effects. However, bounded rationality makes human behaviour deviate from rational behaviour[52]. The 
heuristics people use in assessing probabilities and predicting values under uncertainty result in 
systematic errors[56]. Furthermore, individuals are not only triggered by absolute gains and losses, but also 
by the relative height of these gains and losses compared to a reference value[32]. People value losses 
twice as heavy as gains[57]. Financial incentives might induce an agent to decrease effort if his income is 
above a certain reference income[48]. People relate their gains and losses to those of others. They prefer 
fair outcomes that are based on equality[51]. If people judge an outcome to be unfair, they are willing to 
reciprocate even if this is disadvantageous for them[19]. Non-linear discounting makes people overvalue 
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direct consumption and short term gains compared to future consumption and long term gains[20,22]. An all 
inclusive theory is not yet available. 
Companies often have conflicting interests[11]. The interaction of companies with conflicting interests is 
addressed in non-cooperative Game Theory[37]. A company decides on his actions, given the expected 
actions of the other company that again depend on his own actions. When neither company can improve 
its performance by one-sidedly deviating from a decision, both companies will stick to their decision, and 
a Nash equilibrium exists. In designing an incentive mechanism, a company’s rational drivers for 
decisions and its structural deviations should be considered. 
 
 
Figure 2. Key elements of an incentive mechanism for food safety control 
2.6.1. Control measures 
To control food safety companies use control measures. A control measure is “any action and activity that 
can be used to prevent or eliminate a food safety hazard or reduce it to an acceptable level”[12]. A control 
measure can reduce the risks of multiple hazards or a combination of multiple control measures can be 
necessary to reduce the risk of a hazard. Preventive measures ensure a hazard does not enter a product. 
Curative measures eliminate or reduce the hazard in a product. Curative measures located at the end of 
the production process, are called end-of-pipe measures. The hazard characteristics determine which 
combination of preventive and curative measures effectively controls it. Hazards for which no curative 
measures exist must be controlled by preventive measures, or products contaminated with such hazards 
can be processed separately for markets for which these hazards pose no risk. Hazards that can only enter 
a product with specific operating procedures, can be precluded by not using the operating procedure. For 
contaminations, a combination of preventive and curative control measures can be necessary. The stages 
of the food supply chain for which control measures for a hazard exist should be included in the incentive 
system. The characteristics of the control measures for a hazard and the effectiveness for each company 
should be considered in the design of an incentive system. 
2.6.2. Product flow 
Sampling, testing and control measures as decontamination procedures can increase the turnaround time 
of products within a company and negatively impact shelf life. If two companies have different levels for 
a hazard in a product to accept it, for example due to private standards or different local legislation, this 
can endanger the supply assurance of the company with the tightest level. When suppliers can regularly 
shift deliveries from one buyer to another, the additional effort for compliance with the tighter level can 
result in them to cease delivering to that company. The impact of sampling, testing, control measures and 
Incentive mechanism for food safety control 
Performance reward 
• Financial: 
- Fixed 
- Fixed piece rate 
- Variable piece rate 
- Bonus / penalty, recall 
• Non-financial 
- Information provision 
- Peer pressure 
- Awards, medals 
Performance measurement 
• Food safety performance indicator 
- Process variable: temperature, humidity, CCP 
- Product variable: prevalence, quantity, type-
II-error, public health 
- Input / output, absolute / relative, simple / 
holistic 
- Current / past deliveries 
• Accuracy 
- Sampling strategy: size, acceptance number 
- audit/inspection: number of visits, days per 
visit 
- Testing technology: sensitivity, specificity, 
cut-off value 
- Harmonization auditors/inspectors 
• Who measures performance 
- Principal, third party, agent 
• Costs and time 
12 
norms on product flow and supply assurance must be considered in the design of an incentive system for 
food safety control. 
2.6.3. Financial features 
Products with increased food safety risk can result in additional internal and external failure costs. 
Internal failure costs are additional processing and production costs within the company. External failure 
costs are financial consequences for society due to consumer illness and death and for the following 
stages of the supply chain. The financial consequences for society can be calculated with the human 
capital or the friction cost method[36] using Quality Of Life, Quality Adjusted Life-Year or Disability 
Adjusted Life-Year[1,41]. The financial consequences for the supply chain are additional processing and 
production costs. A company faces the external failure costs through product recalls[55], damaged 
relationships with suppliers with subsequent trade implications, and liability for damages including 
human health problems[9]. External failure costs are only attributable to a company, when traceability 
shows that it is involved[24]. Companies can insure themselves against the external failure costs. 
Control measures increase costs through labor, investment in equipment, or redesign of the production 
process. The preparation, execution, and finalization of audits and inspections require labor of the auditor 
or inspector and company personnel. Testing and sampling require investment in testing and sampling 
technologies and labor of company and laboratory personnel. But, control measures also decrease internal 
and external failure costs. So, control measures can be seen as an insurance against these costs with the 
control measure costs as the insurance premium. Control measures can also result in positive externalities 
as lower production and processing costs, increased sales, higher sales prices, and market access. 
It depends on the owner of and the individual actor in the incentive system how to weigh each of the costs 
and gains in their decision to control food safety. A company, in general, will focus more on the costs it 
faces and less on external failure costs that are not attributable to it. In contrast, a government owned 
system will generally focus more on societal costs and less on company costs. 
The costs and positive externalities of control measures, audits, inspections, testing, sampling procedures, 
and internal and external food safety failures, and how each actor weighs these should be considered in 
the design of a control system for food safety. 
3. Framework for the design and analysis of incentive systems for food 
safety control in supply chains 
In the previous sections we have elaborated upon the key elements of incentive systems for food safety 
control. Figure 3 provides the extended framework for the design and analysis of incentive systems for 
food safety control in supply chains. The characteristics of the hazard determine where and how it can be 
controlled. Food safety and liability legislation provides minimum requirements for the system on 
controlling the hazard. The owner of the incentive system determines the objectives of the system 
concerning the hazard. The system considers the number of companies and ownership structure in all 
supply chain stages in which the hazard can be controlled. Between each two stages an incentive 
mechanism, embedded in the contract between the companies, induces the supplying company to 
implement the necessary control measures. Each incentive mechanism considers the presence of 
information asymmetry. In its decision to control food safety, each company considers the available 
control measures, their effectiveness and financial consequences, the impact on the internal product flow 
and supply assurance, internal and external failure costs, and the incentive mechanism it faces. The extent 
to which external failure costs are attributable to the company depends on the presence of traceability at 
the following supply chain stages and within the company itself. The incentive system for food safety 
control can be optimized by considering the cost of all companies and the timeliness of all processes. 
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Figure 3. Framework for design and analysis of incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains 
4. Conclusion and outlook 
This paper presents a framework for incentive systems for food safety control in supply chains. The 
framework supports the analysis of food safety control issues, emphasizes key elements of food safety 
control from multiple perspectives, and provides insights for the design and analysis of incentive systems 
for food safety control. An incentive system aims to control a hazard in a supply chain by combining 
inter-company incentive mechanisms with intra-company decisions within the legal environment. 
Incentive mechanisms, which consist of a performance measure and a performance reward, induce 
companies to use the necessary control measures. The framework can be used for setting achievable 
targets for food safety hazards and for optimization of food safety control in supply chains. 
It is important to recognize that the knowledge of how to apply incentive systems for food safety control 
in practice is still limited. Insight into the variation in effectiveness or efficiency of incentive mechanisms 
between companies is needed to improve the design of new incentive mechanisms. The elements of an 
Legal environment 
• Hazard specific 
• General food safety 
• Liability 
Incentive system for food safety control 
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• Hazard characteristics: 
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incentive system for food safety control as control measures, supply chain structure, performance reward, 
and performance measurement should be geared to reach effective and efficient food safety control. 
Although the impact of some elements on company decisions has received attention [5,23,34,53,54], more 
insight is needed into the impact of these and other elements to design effective and efficient incentive 
systems for food safety control. Also, knowledge is lacking on the use of non-financial factors as 
information, internal esteem and producing animals according to societal accepted health and welfare 
standards in inducing agents to use control measures. Finally, knowledge about performance 
measurement and provision by an agent himself is lacking. 
The framework presented in this paper was developed specifically for the case of food safety control, but 
it can be adapted for other settings with coordinated actions of multiple companies. For example, it can be 
used to determine the key elements of certification systems like those used for green label producers. As 
such, the framework can be a valuable tool for analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of alternative 
incentive systems in settings where companies have to cooperate with trading partners from other stages 
of the food supply chain. 
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